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ENGLISH ABORTION LAW
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ABSTRACT
Although there is no right to abort in English law but rather abortion is a crime, the
lawful grounds for which are instantiated in the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990), the regulation of abortion is some-
times perceived as being fairly ‘liberal’. Accordingly, the idea that aspects of English law
could be criticised under the European Convention on Human Rights, with which the
UK must comply following the Human Rights Act 1998, may seem unlikely. Indeed,
English law is compatible with the consensus amongst contracting states that abortion
should be available on maternal health grounds. However, analysis of the UK’s negative
obligations under Article 8 shows that section 1(1)(a) of the Act is problematic as it
operates in the ﬁrst trimester. Further, given the European Court of Human Rights’
emphasis on the reduced margin of appreciation once a state has legalised abortion to
some degree and its jurisprudence relating to a state’s positive obligations, the analysis
shows that, while English law may not be problematic in relation to the lack of guide-
lines relating to the lawful grounds for abortion, it may well be in relation to the lack of
a formal system for the review of any two doctors’ decision not to grant a termination.
Notwithstanding the morally serious nature of the decision to abort, the analysis overall
raises questions about the need for at least some degree of abortion law reform, particu-
larly in relation to the ﬁrst trimester, towards a more autonomy-focused, though time-
limited, rights-based approach.
KEYWORDS: Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act 1990), European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, Reform, Rights
I . INTRODUCTION
Contrary perhaps to public perception, there is no right to abort in English law, at
least if a right is understood as implying the freedom to exercise a choice for any or
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no reason.1 Rather, abortion is a crime, the lawful grounds for which are instantiated
in the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
(HFE) Act 1990).2 Accordingly, abortion is lawful only on the basis of certain
grounds, or reasons. Despite this, the regulation of abortion in England is sometimes
perceived as being fairly ‘liberal’.3 Indeed, some relatively recent press and political
attention has criticised it in this regard.4 For this reason, it may seem unlikely that
aspects of English law could be the subject of criticism under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), with which the UK must comply following the
Human Rights (HR) Act 1998. Indeed, English law is compatible with the consensus
amongst contracting states that abortion should be available, for instance, on maternal
health grounds.5 However, analysis of the negative and positive obligations of the UK
under Article 8—the right to respect for private and family life—shows that English
law may yet be vulnerable to challenge.6 Notwithstanding the morally serious nature
of the decision to terminate a pregnancy, this raises questions about the need for at
least some degree of abortion law reform, for instance towards a time-limited
rights-based approach.7
1 As, for instance, in HLA Hart’s Choice theory: HLA Hart, ‘Bentham on Legal Rights’ in AWB Singer
(ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series (OUP, Oxford, 1973) 171–9.
2 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 58 and 59; Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertil-
isation and Embryology Act 1990) s 1(1)(a)–(d).
3 With regard to the law being perceived as ‘liberal’, note for instance that ‘[t]he Department of Health sets a
performance indicator on access to abortion services at under ten weeks gestation to support early access to
abortion and achievement of the Sexual Health Strategy standard of a three weeks maximum waiting time’.
British Pregnancy Advisory Service, Commissioning Abortion Services: A Practical Guide (2008), 6 <http://
www.bpas.org/bpashealthcare/commissioning-bpas>, last accessed 24 May 2015. Note also that most termi-
nations are conducted on the basis of s 1(1)(a), as noted below in text and n 8.
4 As regards political criticism of the current law, note eg the unsuccessful Termination of Pregnancy Bill
2006–7, tabled by Nadine Dorries MP, which did not go beyond a ﬁrst reading. See also D Fenwick, ‘The
Modern Abortion Jurisprudence under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013)
12 Med L Intl 249–76, 275–6. As regards press attention, see further below.
5 See A, B & C v Ireland, App No 25579/05, (2011) 53 EHRR 13, para 235. The case concerned three
claims, the details of which are outwith the scope of this article. However, in brief, with regard to the ﬁrst
and second applicants, using a negative analysis under Article 8, the Court found no breach of Article 8
‘having regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate information
and medical care in Ireland’ (para 241). In contrast, as regards the third applicant, who was concerned
about a risk to her life if her pregnancy continued, the Court found a breach of Ireland’s positive obliga-
tions in relation to the ‘absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory regime providing an access-
ible and effective procedure by which the third applicant could have established whether she qualiﬁed for a
lawful abortion in Ireland in accordance with Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution’ (para 267). As noted
below, Ireland’s abortion law has subsequently been partially reformed.
6 Article 8(1) reads: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corres-
pondence’. Article 8(2) reads: ‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of crime and disorder,
for the protection of morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.
7 As is widely recognised, the question of the morality of abortion is one regarding which people disagree.
On many views of the moral status of abortion, the fetus has at least some claim to moral consideration,
though the strength of its claims will vary according to the view held. Thus, on a potentiality account the
fetus is a person with a right to life from the moment of conception. (See eg J Finnis, ‘The Rights and
Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson’, (1973) 2 Phil & Pub Aff 117–145.) On a gradualist
account, the greater the development of the fetus, the more serious the reasons need be to justify
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The article focuses on three key issues. First, it considers whether the section of
the Act which is employed as the legal basis for most UK abortions, the majority of
which are performed in the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy, is compatible—speciﬁcally as
it applies to the ﬁrst trimester—with the UK’s negative obligations under Article 8.8
This section renders abortion lawful where, in ‘good faith’, two doctors judge ‘that the
pregnancy has not exceeded twenty-four weeks and that the continuance of the preg-
nancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to
the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her
family’. The analysis particularly addresses the so-called ‘statistical argument’—which
holds that the grounds for termination under section 1(1)(a)9 will almost always be
fulﬁlled in the ﬁrst trimester, and questions whether the requirements of section 1(1)
(a), as the main condition of access to lawful abortion in the ﬁrst trimester, constitute
a justiﬁed interference with the right to respect for private life under Article 8. While
the statistical argument’s relevance to section 1(1)(a) has received a certain degree of
academic, professional and political attention, all of which are considered here, the
analysis is the ﬁrst to address the argument in relation to the UK’s human rights
obligations.
Second, in the light of the criminal regulation of abortion and the relatively recent
press, political and governmental attention to its regulation and provision,10 particu-
larly under section 1(1)(a), the article draws on recent European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) abortion case law to consider aspects of the UK’s positive obliga-
tions under Article 8, addressing recent Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) ﬁndings
and Department of Health (DH) statements and policy positions in this process.11 It
asks, ﬁrst, whether the UK has an obligation to produce guidelines for doctors as to
when the lawful conditions for abortion may be met, again with particular reference
to section 1(1)(a). It also asks whether the UK is compliant with Article 8, given the
absence of any formal mechanism of review of any two doctors’ decisions not to grant
a termination. While the ECtHR’s attention to these issues has tended to be cast in
the literature, and to some extent by the Court itself, in a predominantly procedural
termination. (See eg J Feinberg, ‘Abortion’ (1979) in his Freedom and Fulﬁllment (Princeton University
Press: Princeton, 1992) 37–75.) A gradualist approach is implicitly embedded in English abortion law,
given the time-limit of 24 weeks for the least stringent ground of the Act, namely s 1(1)(a). In contrast,
under a personhood account of fetal moral status, the fetus has no moral claims because it is not a person,
for instance because it lacks rationality and self-consciousness. (See MAWarren, ‘On the Moral and Legal
Status of Abortion’, (1973) 57 The Monist 43–61.) Ronald Dworkin, who adopts a gradualist account, has
argued that very few people in fact think that the morality of abortion turns on whether the fetus is a
person: Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (Harper Collins: London, 1993) 27–8.
8 In 2013 (the last year for which ﬁgures are available), the ‘vast majority’ of abortions (180,680 in total)
were carried out under s 1(1)(a) (cited in text below), known as ‘Ground C’: Abortion Statistics, England
and Wales: 2013, Summary Information from the Abortion Notiﬁcation Forms Returned to the Chief Medical
Ofﬁcers of England and Wales, para 2.8. The ‘vast majority’ were performed under 13 weeks: 79% were per-
formed at less than 10 weeks’ gestation; and 12% were performed at 10–12 weeks’ gestation. Ibid, para
2.17. Of note, abortions after 24 weeks accounted for less than 0.1% of the total (190). Ibid, para 2.19.
These percentages are very similar to those in recent years.
9 And also section 1(1)(c) in fact, below.
10 See discussion below.
11 See discussion below.
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light,12 the issues of guidelines and review may readily affect the substantive question
of access to abortion.
Third, in the light of the analysis of the ﬁrst two issues, the possibility of at least
some degree of abortion law reform, particularly in relation to section 1(1)(a) and
the ﬁrst trimester, is raised. A move to a time-limited rights-based approach would
respond to highly important recommendations in a Resolution of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 2008, which have been described as
‘groundbreaking’.13
Before turning to consider the relationship between the ECHR and aspects of
English abortion law, the article ﬁrst gives a brief background section on the Court’s
approach to Article 8 in the abortion context.
I I . THE ECHR, ARTICLE 8 AND ABORTION
The ECHR jurisprudence on abortion has its origins in decisions of the European
Commission, which addressed the issue of Article 8, in relation to the pregnant
woman, and Article 2 (the right to life) in relation to the foetus.14
It is worth brieﬂy noting the ﬁrst case to consider the issue of abortion under the
ECHR, Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany,15 because it is still cited as an important
case by the Court.16 In Brüggemann the Commission held (in part), that ‘pregnancy
cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life. Whenever a woman is
pregnant, her private life becomes closely connected with the developing foetus’.17
This passage is somewhat opaque. However, as the dissenting Judge Fawcett implied
in his assessment of the majority judgment, the Commission appears to have held
that since pregnancy is not only part of private life, regulation of pregnancy does not
constitute an inference into private life and thus does not have to be justiﬁed under
Article 8(2).18
Despite being a decision of the Commission, Brüggemann has played a prominent
role in the ECtHR’s abortion jurisprudence, typically being mentioned in a respectful
light by the Court as forming the backdrop to its own analyses of abortion law. At the
12 See esp. C Zampas and JM Gher, ‘Abortion as a Human Right – International and Regional Standards’,
(2008) 8/2 Hum Rights L Rev 249–94, at 277, 278, and 279. See also D Fenwick, ‘“Abortion Jurispru-
dence” at Strasbourg: Deferential, Avoidant and Normatively Neutral?’, (2014) 34 Legal Stud 214–41,
227–8; but note also his reservations regarding this characterisation at 229 and in Fenwick, above n 4, 265.
13 Council of Europe, Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe, Resolution 1607 (2008). Footnote 1 reads:
‘Assembly debate on 16 April 2008 (15th Sitting) (see Doc. 11537 rev., report of the Committee on Equal
Opportunities for Women and Men, rapporteur: Mrs Gisela Wurm; and Doc. 11576, opinion of the
Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mrs Christine McCafferty). Text adopted by the
Assembly on 16 April 2008 (15th Sitting)’. The description of the signiﬁcance of the Resolution is that of
Zampas and Gher, above n 12, 251.
14 In Paton v United Kingdom (1980) 3 EHRR 408, the Commission held, in para 19, that the fetus could not
have an absolute right to life under Article 2; it also held that if it were assumed that the fetus did have a
right to life during the ﬁrst trimester, this would be limited by virtue of the legal ground relied on for the
abortion in question (para 38). In the earlier case of Paton v BPAS Trustees [1979] QB 276 a husband
failed to obtain an injunction restraining an abortion being carried out on his wife.
15 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany (1981) 3 EHRR 244.
16 Eg in A, B & C v Ireland, para 216.
17 Brüggemann and Scheuten v Germany, para 59.
18 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Mr JES Fawcett, para 1.
4 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
 at K
ing's College London - Journals D
ept on M
arch 22, 2016
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
same time, the lack of clarity in the Commission’s reasoning appears over time to
have enabled the Court subtly but signiﬁcantly to shift its position on the applicability
of Article 8 to pregnancy. Importantly, despite recalling Brüggemann, the Court’s
more recent analyses appear now to have evolved into a position in which the regula-
tion of abortion does constitute an interference with private life and, accordingly, must
be justiﬁed under Article 8(2). For instance, in the important recent decision of A, B
& C v Ireland the Court observed19:
The Court has previously noted, citing with approval the case-law of the former
Commission in Brüggemann . . . that not every regulation of the termination of
pregnancy constitutes an interference with the right to respect for the private
life of the mother (Vo v France . . .). Nevertheless, having regard to the broad
concept of private life within the meaning of Article 8 including the right to per-
sonal autonomy and to physical and psychological integrity . . . , the Court ﬁnds
that the prohibition of the termination of the ﬁrst and second applicants’ preg-
nancies sought for reasons of health and/or well being amounted to an interfer-
ence with their right to respect for their private lives.
In this passage, the Court appears relatively openly to shift the analysis from that of
Brüggemann, as evidenced by its use of ‘[n]evertheless’ and clearly states that abortion
regulation must be justiﬁed under Article 8(2). Adopting a somewhat different
method, in RR v Poland, decided the year after A, B & C, the Court appears instead to
reinterpret Brüggemann, observing20:
The Court has also held that the notion of private live [sic] applies to decisions
both to have or not to have a child or to become parents (Evans v the United
Kingdom . . .). The Court has previously found, citing with approval the case-law
of the former Commission, that the decision of a pregnant woman to continue her
pregnancy or not belongs to the sphere of private life and autonomy. Consequently,
also legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere
of private life, since whenever a woman is pregnant her private life becomes
closely connected with the developing foetus.
19 A, B & C v Ireland, para 216, my emphasis.
20 RR v Poland, App No 27617/04, (2011) 53 EHRR 31, paras 180–1, citing Brüggemann, Tysiąc v Poland
(App No 5410/03, (2007) 45 EHRR 42) and A, B & C, my emphasis. See especially the Court’s conclu-
sions in paras 208–11 and its ﬁnding of a breach of Article 8 in para 214. In this case, a woman whose
foetus was suspected of having a serious genetic condition was not granted timely access to prenatal
genetic testing and was therefore precluded from the possibility of access to termination under Article 4(a)
1.2 of the 1993 Family Planning Act. (In Evans v United Kingdom (2007) App No 6339/05 (2008) 46
EHRR 34, the ECtHR held that an embryo does not have a right to life under Article 2 (para 56). The
case concerned a challenge to the consent provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990, speciﬁcally whether a man should be able to withdraw his consent to the continued storage of
embryos created with his former partner when, as a result of treatment for cancer of her ovaries, she
wished to use those embryos and had no other way of becoming a genetic mother. The ECtHR held that
there had been no violation of Articles 8 or 14.)
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Here Brüggemann appears to be recast as a decision that would have implied that the
regulation of pregnancy has to be justiﬁed under Article 8(2), the position in fact held
by the dissenting Judge Fawcett in that case. In short, as its other relatively recent
jurisprudence—for instance in Tysiąc v Poland—also shows,21 it is now clear that the
Court holds that abortion regulation amounts to an interference in the right to
respect for private life under Article 8(1) and must therefore be justiﬁed under Article
8(2).
As for the nature of the interests in private life that the Court has recognised in
this context, as can be seen above, in A, B & C the Court noted that it has ‘regard to
the broad concept of private life within the meaning of Article 8 including the right to
personal autonomy and to physical and psychological integrity’; and in RR v Poland it
observes that ‘the decision of a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy or not
belongs to the sphere of private life and autonomy’. While the relationship between
privacy and autonomy has long been the subject of debate in the literature,22 the
Court is prepared to recognise a range of interests, including those in autonomy,
under Article 8. Although it has acknowledged autonomy interests in the abortion
context in its jurisprudence, such interests have not so far received as prominent an
emphasis as they have in other medical law contexts, such as that of its jurisprudence
in relation to assisted suicide.23 Further, in some abortion cases the interest in physical
integrity has played a particularly prominent role, such as in Tysiąc v Poland, perhaps
particularly given the issues at stake in that case, which related to termination on phys-
ical maternal health grounds, discussed below.
Focusing on section 1(1)(a) of the Act as it operates in the ﬁrst trimester, the ana-
lysis turns shortly to consider whether English abortion law is Convention-compliant.
Prior to this, some brief background relating to negative and positive obligations in
turn, with particular reference to recent ECtHR abortion jurisprudence, is given.
A. Negative and Positive Obligations: Blurred Distinctions and
the Narrowing of the Margin of Appreciation
Convention states are under a negative obligation not unjustiﬁably to interfere with
the right to respect for private and family life and a positive obligation to respect that
right. The Court purports to use the terms ‘interference’ and ‘respect’ in quite distinct
ways that map onto a state’s negative and positive obligations in turn. In the ﬁrst case,
the question is essentially whether a given arrangement amounts to an unjustiﬁed
(negative) interference with, say, the right to respect for private and family life. In the
second, the question is whether a given set of legal arrangements respects someone’s
ability to exercise that legally recognised right or to realise that legally recognised
interest. Thus, as the discussion will show, a (positive) failure of respect for an interest
21 Tysiąc v Poland, paras 105–7.
22 For instance, on one view, although not a proxy for autonomy, privacy might be a subset of it: T Halper,
‘Privacy and Autonomy: from Warren and Brandeis to Roe and Cruzan’, 21 J Med Philos (1996) 124–35,
133. On another view, a major ﬂaw in work on privacy has been the notion that privacy and autonomy are
synonymous concepts; rather, privacy should not be confused with, and indeed is unrelated to, autonomy:
WA Parent, ‘Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy’ (1983) 20 Am Philos Q 341–55, 345.
23 Pretty v United Kingdom, App No 2346/02, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, in which the Court found that the illegality
of assisted suicide in the UK was compatible with the ECHR under Art 8(2).
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or right in fact may affect a person’s substantive ability to exercise a right or to realise
an interest, just as does a (negative) interference with a right. It may not be surprising
then, that the Court has noted that the boundaries between negative and positive obli-
gations ‘do not lend themselves to precise deﬁnition’.24
Turning ﬁrst to the Court’s approach to the analysis of a state’s negative obligations
under Article 8, as the Court frequently reiterates, whether an interference is justiﬁ-
able under Article 8(2) involves a three-step analysis which considers whether the
measure is in accordance with law, has a legitimate aim, and is necessary.25 The third
element in turn hinges on a three-step assessment, established in Sunday Times v
United Kingdom,26 that concerns whether there is a pressing social need for the inter-
ference, whether it is proportionate to the legitimate aim (there are conceptual links
here with the idea of a pressing social need) and whether there are relevant and sufﬁ-
cient reasons for it. A detailed explication of these points can be found elsewhere.27
The notion of proportionality between the interests and rights of the individual on
the one hand and those of the community on the other, including the public interest,
is fundamental in this assessment and underlies the Convention as a whole. Thus, in
Soering v United Kingdom, the ECtHR observed: ‘Inherent in the whole of the Con-
vention is a search for the fair balance between the demands of the general interest of
the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s human
rights’.28
As for the Court’s analysis of a state’s positive obligations under Article 8, in the
abortion case of Tysiąc v Poland the ECtHR reiterates some general background of
relevance here. It observes of the state’s positive obligations29:
[T]hese . . . may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect
for private life even in the sphere of relations between individuals, including
both the provision of a regulatory framework of adjudicatory and enforcement
machinery protecting individuals’ rights and the implementation, where appro-
priate, of speciﬁc measures.
As in the negative context, the boundary with which the Court acknowledges is not
precise, the Court must attend to the ‘fair balance’ between the interests of the
individual and those of the community and, once again, the state has a certain margin
of appreciation.30 As the Court has acknowledged, the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear,
particularly regarding a state’s positive obligations and, ‘having regard to the diversity
of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the
24 Tysiąc v Poland, para 111.
25 See eg A, B & C itself, paras 219–42 regarding the ﬁrst and second applicants.
26 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245.
27 See eg J Wadham and others, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, (Blackstone’s: London, 6th
edn, 2011) paras 2.54–2.64.
28 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89.
29 Tysiąc v Poland, para 110. Here the Court found a breach of Article 8 in relation to Polish law, on the basis
of a lack of a clear procedure, in the face of disagreement, to review whether the criteria for a lawful abor-
tion on health grounds had been established.
30 Ibid, para 111.
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notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case’.31 Nevertheless, the
Court emphasises that the requirements of the rule of law, ‘inherent’ in all the Con-
vention Articles, must provide a degree of protection against arbitrary interference
with Convention rights. The idea that rights should be ‘practical and effective’, rather
than ‘theoretical or illusory’ is also emphasised in Tysiąc and is of relevance likewise in
the UK context.32 In A, B & C v Ireland, the Court notes that ‘certain factors’ have
been thought relevant in determining the content of a state’s positive obligations and
that as regards the applicant, there is the question of how important the interest at
stake is, and whether ‘“fundamental values” or “essential aspects” of private life are in
issue’.33
In Tysiąc itself, the Court decided to assess the applicant’s claim that she had been
denied access to an abortion with particular reference to the state’s positive obliga-
tions to respect her interest in physical integrity.34 The issues in this case concerned
the lack of a review procedure regarding the denial of the applicant’s request for an
abortion on health grounds, coupled with the lack of guidelines to determine whether
the conditions for lawful abortion were met. These—and their implications for the
UK—are discussed below. For present purposes, what emerges strongly from Tysiąc
is that, even if states may be permitted a certain margin of appreciation in relation to
the regulation of abortion, once a state has established a particular legal regime, the
margin of appreciation narrows because the state can be held to account for not fulﬁll-
ing its obligations within that regime.35 This is a very important point, which relates
to the Court’s wish to ensure, as noted above, that rights are not just hypothetical, but
can be exercised in practice.36 As described by Fenwick, for instance, with reference
both to Tysiąc and to RR v Poland, ‘the Court took the stance that where the state has
provided for a degree of access to abortion to be available in law, the state’s margin of
appreciation does not extend to the manner in which it is made available’.37 The net
result is that a state’s legal arrangements may then be subject to what Fenwick has
referred to as ‘more intensive scrutiny’, with reference also to P & S v Poland.38
The discussion now turns to consider the implications of these points for the UK,
focusing on the interpretation and operation of section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act.
31 Ibid, para 112.
32 Ibid, para 113, citing Airey v Ireland (1981) 3 EHRR 592.
33 A, B & C v Ireland, para 248, citing X and Y v the Netherlands, (1986) 8 EHRR 235. For factors concerning
the state, see further para 248.
34 ‘The Court notes that in the case before it a particular combination of different aspects of private life is
concerned. While the State regulations on abortion relate to the traditional balancing of privacy and the
public interest, they must – in case of a therapeutic abortion – also be assessed against the positive obliga-
tions of the State to secure the physical integrity of mothers-to-be’. Tysiąc v Poland, para 107.
35 Ibid, para 116: ‘Once the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it’. See also A, B & C v Ireland, para 249.
36 Airey v Ireland.
37 Fenwick, above n 4, 261, emphasis in original.
38 Fenwick, above n 12, 227; P & S v Poland, App No 57375/08, Judgment of October 30 2012, para 99. The
case concerned a 14-year-old rape victim, P, who had great difﬁculty obtaining an abortion despite being
legally entitled to one.
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I I I . ENGLISH ABORTION LAW: ARTICLE 8 AND
SECTION 1(1)(A) OF THE ABORTION ACT
The termination of pregnancy in England is a crime under the Offences against the
Person Act 1861.39 However, abortion is legal under section 1 of the amended Abor-
tion Act 1967 if two doctors judge in ‘good faith’40:
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family; or (b) that the termination is
necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of
the pregnant woman; or (c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated; or (d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be ser-
iously handicapped.
My focus here is particularly on the ﬁrst of these—section 1(1)(a)—and especially as
it applies in the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy because, as noted earlier, most termina-
tions are performed under this ground before 12 weeks.41 What is the nature and
purpose of the criteria in section 1(1)(a)?
These criteria have been described by the British Medical Association (BMA) as
‘medical’ justiﬁcations which, at one level, they are.42 By implication, this description
would also apply to the grounds in sections 1(1)(b) and (c). Legally, the criteria in
section 1(1)(a) render lawful conduct that would otherwise be a crime for the ﬁrst 24
weeks of pregnancy. Morally, they reﬂect the view that such risks to a pregnant
woman justify the termination of foetal life. The analysis now turns to consider
section 1(1)(a) in the light of the UK’s negative and positive obligations under
Article 8, respectively.
A. Negative Obligations: the Question of the Justiﬁability of the Interference
As far as the UK’s negative obligations in relation to the ECHR are concerned, the
key question in relation to the operation of section 1(1)(a) in the ﬁrst trimester is
whether the criminal prohibition on the termination of foetal life unless there is a risk
to the woman’s mental or physical health in going to term that is greater than in
termination constitutes a justiﬁable interference with her right to respect for her
private life.
In the abortion context, for instance in Tysiąc, the ECtHR has recently focused on
the right to respect for private life as being instantiated in the interest in physical
integrity. Although, as noted above, autonomy interests do receive brief mention in
39 Offences against the Person Act 1861, ss 58 and 59.
40 Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) s 1(1)(a)–(d).
41 However, brief reference will be made to the other grounds as appropriate.
42 BMA, First Trimester Abortion: A Brieﬁng Paper by the BMA’s Medical Ethics Committee (ARM: London,
2007), 2.
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the cases,43 the Court appears to date to have underplayed somewhat the importance
of autonomy in the abortion context, which it has recognised in other contexts,
emphasising instead the question of health interests, a point also noted by others,
such as Fenwick and Zampas and Gher.44 Accordingly, currently at least, the UK’s
negative obligations in relation to the right to respect for private life in the abortion
context most clearly—but arguably not only—hinge on recognising a certain degree
of a woman’s interests in physical and psychological integrity, so that her right to
respect for her private life is not unjustiﬁably interfered with. The question of ascer-
taining what the law recognises with regard to these negative obligations under
section 1(1)(a) requires a certain degree of interpretation, to which I turn below.
Whether the UK then respects/protects what is recognised is essentially a question
about whether it is fulﬁlling its positive obligations, also discussed below.
1. The Aim of Criminalisation and the Corresponding Lawful Ground in Section 1(1)(a)
Turning to the ﬁrst question under the three-step analysis of the justiﬁability of an
interference under Article 8(2), since abortion is regulated by two statutes (one estab-
lishing the crime, the other the lawful grounds), there is no question that the English
provisions are in accordance with law. As for the second question—namely the legitim-
ate aim of the establishment of the crime of abortion, the lawful grounds for which
are those in section 1(1)(a) of the Act—this is not so clear. Legitimate aims of pos-
sible relevance under Article 8(2) include ‘the protection of morals’ and the ‘protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others’.
In its report, Scientiﬁc Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 196745 (which gave
considerable attention to section 1(1)(a) and its operation in the ﬁrst trimester) the
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recorded a number of
reasons ‘that have been given for the introduction of the requirement for two doctor’s
signatures’ in the Abortion Act, as follows46:
[T]o ensure that the provisions in the legislation were being observed; to
protect women; to protect doctors from breaking the law; to demonstrate the
medico-legal concerns of Parliament, namely that the 1967 Act did not make
abortion legal but conferred upon doctors a defence against illegality—the two
doctors are expected to police each other; to show the seriousness of the deci-
sion to terminate; and to appease the pro-life lobby.
It is unclear whether the Committee is concerned with the criminalisation of abortion
per se, or the mechanism by which the lawful grounds to the crime are ‘policed’.47
43 Eg, A, B & C v Ireland, para 216.
44 Pretty v United Kingdom; Fenwick, above n 4, 273; Zampas and Gher, above n 12, 265.
45 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Scientiﬁc Developments Relating to the Abortion
Act 1967, Twelfth Report of Session 2006–07, Vol I, 29 October 2007.
46 Ibid, para 85, footnotes referring to evidence submissions omitted.
47 Note that, in conclusion to its Terms of Reference, the Report stated: ‘As a Committee that examines sci-
entiﬁc and technological issues, we decided that the ethical and moral issues of abortion were not within
our remit. Therefore, we decided to focus on scientiﬁc and medical evidence relating to abortion, and expli-
citly ruled out ethical or moral issues in the published terms of reference’. Ibid, para 3.
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However, since my concern goes beyond the ‘policing’ issue to that of the criminal
nature of the regulation of English law, particularly as it plays out in the ﬁrst trimester,
it is the penultimate of these reasons, the notion of ‘show[ing] the seriousness of the
decision to terminate’, that may be particularly relevant here. (An evaluation of the
‘politics’ of the Act that may have been at stake in the last reason is beyond my
scope.) The BMA has also noted that some have argued that the criteria may encour-
age women not to undertake abortion ‘lightly’.48 So, focusing on section 1(1)(a), one
purpose of the criminal regulation of abortion could be the aim of encouraging some
kind of ‘respect’ for foetal life, so that terminations are not undertaken, as it were,
without due moral reﬂection. This could be thought to be relevant to the aim of the
‘protection of morals’ under Article 8(2). A broader expression of some kind of soci-
etal respect for the foetus may well also be at stake.
Turning to the question of the pregnant woman’s relationship with the foetus,
people obviously disagree about whether, and if so how much, foetal life should be
respected and also about what this would entail.49 However, as a matter of practice,
although doctors may choose to discuss the criteria with women, there are no guide-
lines requiring them to do so when women present with their concerns and reasons.50
In any event, Joanna Erdman has noted that it is ‘widely reported that most women
have reached a ﬁrm decision on whether to continue or terminate pregnancy before
seeking health services’.51 Accordingly, it is unclear that this ground will necessarily
serve the purpose of encouraging respect for foetal life on the woman’s part, by
means of serious consideration of it, notwithstanding that a woman will discuss her
reasons with a doctor. This does not preclude the possibility that the woman would
herself have given serious moral consideration to the question of termination prior to
approaching a doctor, independently of the terms of legal access to abortion. Sally
Sheldon has likewise noted this, suggesting that women may well ‘agonise’ over the
decision.52
In the alternative, but perhaps more particularly in addition—since this would also
be compatible with the notion of ‘respect’ for foetal life—the purpose of the crime
and the corresponding lawful grounds under section 1(1)(a) could be the more
straightforward one of reducing the number of terminations that might otherwise
occur if the crime and the lawful grounds were not in place, that is, of protecting
48 BMA, above n 42, 4, citing RC Henshaw and AA Templeton, ‘Mifepristone: Separating Fact from Fiction’
(1992) 44 Drugs 531–6.
49 On the question of respect, note Ronald Dworkin’s argument, above n 7, 27–8, that on both sides of the
abortion debate people are really concerned with whether and why human life is ‘sacred’, coupled with the
ways in which human life may be respected or disrespected.
50 In contrast, this is the case to some extent in the USA and has been the subject of judicial deliberation in,
eg, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey (1992) 120 LEd2d 674. Casey gave more
weight to the State’s interest in potential life than Roe v Wade (1973 35 LEd2d 147) and therefore allowed
states to create laws establishing a ‘reasonable framework’ to ensure that a woman’s decision to abort is
‘thoughtful and informed’ (712 and 711, respectively) holding that ‘what is at stake is the woman’s right to
make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in so doing’ (715). For extensive dis-
cussion, see especially R. Dworkin, above n 7.
51 J Erdman, ‘Access to Information on Safe Abortion: A Harm Reduction and Human Rights Approach’
(2011) 34 Harvard JL Gender 413–62, 445, footnote and citations omitted.
52 S Sheldon, ‘A Missed Opportunity to Reform an Outdated Law’, (2009) 4 Clinical Ethics 3–5, 4.
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foetal life itself. In this respect, the foetus would have to be an ‘other’ under the aim
of the ‘protection of the rights and freedom of others’ under Article 8(2) (which does
not require that the ‘other’ possesses Convention rights). Is the criminal structure of
the law necessary to achieve this aim? This takes us to the third question entailed in
the three-step analysis of the justiﬁability of the interference.
2. Whether Criminalisation and the Corresponding Lawful Ground in
Section 1(1)(a) are Necessary
This is a question about proportionality and entails assessing whether a ‘fair balance’ has
been struck between the interests of the individual and those of the community, includ-
ing the public interest.53 Thus, is there a sufﬁciently strong public interest in reducing the
incidence of terminations to justify interference with a woman’s right to private life and,
in this context, particularly her interest in physical and psychological integrity? As noted
earlier, under this third limb of the assessment of the justiﬁability of an interference, Con-
vention jurisprudence requires that we consider, ﬁrst, whether there is a ‘pressing social
need’ for this legal arrangement. If we assume that the actual protection of foetal life is a
legitimate aim, a key question may be whether foetal life would be more frequently termi-
nated if abortion were not a crime with a corresponding lawful ground under section 1
(1)(a). Thus, the number of abortions that would occur with and without this legal
arrangement appears relevant to the question of a ‘pressing social need’. This raises the
question of the extent to which doctors comply with requests and consider that the cri-
teria are satisﬁed. In turn, this requires that we consider the degree of scope for interpret-
ing the criteria and so the extent to which the criteria in fact limit access to abortion.
a. Interpreting the Criteria in Section 1(1)(a)
The term ‘mental and physical health’ is open to interpretation. The Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) refers in its guidance to the World Health
Organisation’s (WHO) deﬁnition of health as ‘. . . a state of physical, mental and
social wellbeing and not merely an absence of disease or inﬁrmity’ and observes54:
In determining whether there is a risk to mental health in a particular pregnancy
the medical practitioners have to identify factors in the woman’s life and per-
sonality that would threaten her mental health if the pregnancy were to con-
tinue: they do not have to certify that she has a mental illness.
The law on its face implies that it will be within doctors’ discretion to evaluate a
woman’s reasons for requesting a termination and the risks to her of going to term
versus termination, so that a termination may or may not be granted. Understood and
applied in this way, the crime and the section 1(1)(a) criteria have the ability to affect
the number of abortions by ﬁltering out cases that doctors may consider do not satisfy
the criteria. Doctors may vary in their reactions to such requests, some taking a more
liberal approach than others.
53 See eg Tysiąc v Poland, para 111, citing Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342, para 49.
54 RCOG, Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnormality in England, Wales and Scotland (January 1996) para
3.4, with regard to s 1(1)(a).
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If doctors were to deny access to termination on a signiﬁcant number of occasions,
the incidence of termination would be signiﬁcantly reduced, so that one might con-
clude that there was a pressing social need for this discretion. However, there is also
the question as to whether the interference in the right to respect for private life is
proportionate to the legitimate aim of reducing the incidence of abortion (recalling
the conceptual links with the idea of a pressing social need), as well as that of whether
there are relevant and sufﬁcient reasons for it. The effect on the number of termina-
tions, about which empirical evidence would be required, would appear to be relevant
at each stage of the ‘necessity analysis’, as may be questions of the weight to be
accorded to foetal life. It might be noted, however, with reference to criminal abortion
laws generally, that Erdman has observed that there is no correlation between abor-
tion rates and the legal status of abortion, noting that criminalisation does not result
in the prevention of abortion.55 Further, this conclusion has been endorsed by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.56
Accordingly, leaving this strand of analysis aside, the discussion now turns to
address the argument that, statistically, the grounds for termination under section 1
(1)(a) (and section 1(1)(c) in fact) will automatically be fulﬁlled in the ﬁrst trimester.
While the ‘statistical argument’ has received prior professional, academic and political
attention, it has not been previously considered in the context of a human rights ana-
lysis. I turn ﬁrst to consider the attention the argument has received to date.
In a brieﬁng paper entitled First Trimester Abortion, the BMA Medical Ethics Com-
mittee (MEC) notes that ‘evidence shows that the risks involved in ﬁrst trimester
abortion, particularly medical abortions, are less than the risks associated with carry-
ing a pregnancy to term’, adding that ‘[i]n practice, therefore, few, if any, women will
fail to meet the medical criteria in the ﬁrst trimester’.57 The MEC goes on to state
that ‘there are always legal grounds for abortion . . . because the risk to the life, and
physical and mental health of a pregnant woman, of continuing a pregnancy, although
low, will always be greater than the risk of terminating a pregnancy . . .’, citing Ian
Kennedy and Andrew Grubb.58 Writing separately on this point, Andrew Grubb has
argued that this must be so, unless there are reasons in a given woman’s case to ‘upset
the “statistical argument”’, adding that ‘[u]ltimately, the doctors must form an
opinion that the ground applies to this individual and not solely on the basis of
abstract statistics’.59
55 J Erdman, above n 51, 458.
56 ‘The Assembly takes the view that abortion should not be banned within reasonable gestational limits. A
ban on abortions does not result in fewer abortions but mainly leads to clandestine abortions, which are
more traumatic and increase maternal mortality and/or lead to abortion “tourism” which is costly, and
delays the timing of an abortion and results in social inequities. The lawfulness of abortion does not have
an effect on a woman’s need for an abortion, but only on her access to a safe abortion’. Council of Europe,
above n 13, para 4. For relevant discussion, see also Zampas and Gher, above n 12, 287–8.
57 BMA, above n 42, 2, footnote omitted. (This cites, ‘for example’: Conﬁdential Enquiry into Maternal and
Child Health: Why Mothers Die 2000–2002 (RCOG Press: London, 2004); Royal College of Obstetricians
and Gynaecologists, The Care of Women Requesting Induced Abortion (RCOG Press: London, 2004); and
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Thromboprophylaxis during Pregnancy, Labour and after
Vaginal Delivery, Guideline No 37 (RCOG, 2007).)
58 Ibid, 3, citing I Kennedy and A Grubb,Medical Law (Butterworths: London, 3rd edn, 2000) 1420.
59 A Grubb, ‘The New Law of Abortion: Clariﬁcation or Ambiguity?’ (1991) Sep Crim LR 659–70, 661.
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In this light, the BMA brieﬁng paper goes on to state that ‘[t]he MEC believes that
the requirement for medical criteria should be removed from ﬁrst trimester abortions’,
and that it ‘believes that the requirement for two doctors’ opinions should be
removed for abortions within the ﬁrst trimester’.60 In its evidence to the House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee, the BMA stated61:
The BMA believes that the Abortion Act 1967 should be amended so that ﬁrst
trimester abortion (abortions up to 13 weeks) is available on the same basis of
informed consent as other treatment, and therefore without the need for two
doctors’ signatures, and without the need to meet speciﬁed medical criteria.
From a clinical perspective abortion is better carried out early in pregnancy.
Given the relative risks of early abortion compared with pregnancy and child-
birth, virtually all women seeking an abortion in the ﬁrst trimester will meet the
current criteria for abortion. The proposed amendment would help ensure that
women seeking abortion are not exposed to delays, and consequently to later,
more costly and higher risk procedures.
It also provided further details of the relevant evidence.62 The RCOG likewise argued
in favour of this point in response to the Committee’s enquiry, observing that63:
[W]omen in the ﬁrst trimester could be seen as automatically fulﬁlling the cri-
teria of [section 1(1)(a) of] the Abortion Act. Although this was not the ori-
ginal intention of the Act, in practice it facilitates access to induced abortion
within the current law.
More recently, the British Pregnancy and Advisory Service (BPAS) has also supported
this interpretation.64 We might call this the ‘automatic interpretation’.
Signiﬁcantly, this argument was accepted by the House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee, which included a review of the above-noted arguments of
the BMA and the RCOG. With reference to the automatic interpretation, the Com-
mittee stated that ‘[t]here were dissenters to this view, but we found strong evidence
that ground C is always met for ﬁrst trimester abortions’.65 It then concluded66:
60 BMA, above n 42, 4.
61 BMA, Memorandum of Evidence to the Science and Technology Committee Inquiry into the Scientiﬁc Develop-
ments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967, August 2007 (October 2007), para 2, my emphasis.
62 Ibid, paras 11–14.
63 As cited in the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45, para 94, my emphasis.
64 ‘In 2012, medical evidence is clear that, purely on a physical level, abortion carries less risk of maternal
mortality and morbidity than does childbirth. . . . Thus it could be argued that any abortion carried out
under Section 1(1)(a) (the ground on which 98 per cent of abortions are carried out) would always be
lawful, provided the authorising doctors were acting on the basis of a good faith reliance on this medical
evidence base.’ Britain’s Abortion Law: What it Says and Why (British Pregnancy Advisory Service, May
2013) 7, <http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf>, last accessed
24 May 2014.
65 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45, para 95, my emphasis.
66 Ibid, para 99. There is no reference to the fetus among the list of purposes, but this may be implied in ‘any
other useful purpose’. The Committee notes the evidence submissions in favour of this argument in para 93.
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We were not presented with any good evidence that, at least in the ﬁrst trimes-
ter, the requirement for two doctors’ signatures serves to safeguard women or
doctors in any meaningful way, or serves any other useful purpose. We are con-
cerned that the requirement . . . may be causing delays in access to abortion ser-
vices. If a goal of public policy is to encourage early as opposed to later
abortion, we believe there is a strong case for removing the requirement for two
doctors’ signatures. We would like [sic] see this requirement . . . removed.
In short, while purporting to give doctors discretion in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the criteria under section 1(1)(a), the criteria could be interpreted as having
pre-determined the legal balance between a pregnant woman and the foetus in the
ﬁrst trimester. It is unlikely that Parliament was aware that the criteria might be inter-
preted in this way in relation to the ﬁrst trimester since this would obviate the need
for the crime, the criteria in section 1(1)(a) and the two doctors’ signatures.
There are highly important and previously unconsidered implications of this inter-
pretation for the question of the justiﬁability of the interference posed by section 1(1)
(a) of the Act—as it applies in the ﬁrst trimester—into a woman’s private life under
Article 8. First, given that (as the BMA put it) ‘few, if any, women will fail to meet the
medical criteria’, the crime and the corresponding lawful grounds in section 1(1)(a)
cannot be said to respond to a pressing social need. Second, in the light of the
medical evidence, requiring all women seeking abortion in the ﬁrst trimester to be
subject to the criteria is disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting foetal life
(recalling the centrality of the notion of proportionality to the necessity test and the
conceptual links with the notion of a pressing social need).67 Third, while the reasons
for the crime and the lawful grounds in section 1(1)(a) as they apply in the ﬁrst tri-
mester are relevant to the aim of protecting foetal life, they do not appear sufﬁcient to
justify the interference with the right to respect for private life. Thus, since there will
always (or almost always) be greater risk to the woman in going to term than in ter-
mination in the ﬁrst trimester, to impose a requirement to this effect as a condition of
access to abortion in all cases, is unnecessary. Accordingly, on the automatic interpret-
ation (and leaving the other grounds of the Act aside), making abortion lawful in the
ﬁrst trimester on the basis of the grounds of section 1(1)(a) would not pass the justiﬁ-
cation test under Article 8(2). This is of considerable signiﬁcance when most abor-
tions are carried out under this ground of the Act before 12 weeks.
Arguably, this is a justiﬁable interpretation of the law. However, there are no ofﬁcial
guidelines as to how section 1(1)(a) should be interpreted. Does the UK have a posi-
tive obligation to issue these?
B. Positive Obligations: Respect, Guidelines and Review
The question in relation to the UK’s positive obligations is whether the current legal
arrangement sufﬁciently protects/respects a woman’s interest in psychological and
67 Proportionality ‘is at the heart of the necessity test’ and ‘requires a reasonable relationship between the
goal pursued and the means the state has chosen to achieve that goal . . . the state must not use a sledge-
hammer to crack a nut’. J Wadham and others, above n 27, para 2.62, footnote omitted citing Fayed v
United Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR 393, para 71.
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physical integrity, as recognised in section 1(1)(a). Against the criminal backdrop of
English law, here the analysis addresses again, from a different light, the issue of the
scope for the interpretation of section 1(1)(a) of the Act, with particular regard to
the ﬁrst trimester, followed by the question of the absence of any system of formal
review of any two doctors’ decision not to grant a termination.
Doctors performing abortions in England are at once performing a crime and
judging (or relying on one (or two) other doctors’ judgment) in ‘good faith’, that one
or more of the lawful grounds under the Abortion Act is made out. The ECtHR com-
mented in both Tysiąc and A, B & C on the effect that criminal sanctions may have on
the provision of abortion, referring to the notion of a ‘chilling effect’ or ‘chilling
factor’.68 The Court referred to two particular issues in both these cases: ﬁrst, to the
breadth—and potential uncertainty—of a provision establishing the legality of abor-
tion; and second, to the question of the lack of a mechanism to review doctors’ deci-
sions not to offer terminations.69 These issues were prominent also in RR v Poland
and P & S v Poland, as also noted below.
1. Guidelines
Turning ﬁrst to A, B &C, the Court noted the ‘broad’ terms in which the ground for
legal abortion in Ireland is expressed, namely where ‘it is established as a matter of
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the
health, of the mother, including a risk of self harm [sic], which can only be avoided by
a termination of the pregnancy’.70 It observed that although ‘a constitutional provision
of this scope is not unusual, no criteria or procedures have been subsequently laid
down in Irish law, whether in legislation, case law or otherwise, by which that risk is
to be measured or determined, leading to uncertainty as to its precise application’.71
The Court further noted that ‘the guidelines do not in any event provide any relevant
precision as to the criteria by which a doctor is to assess the risk’.72 In the light of this
‘background of substantial uncertainty’ the A, B & C Court held that the criminal
structure of Irish law ‘would constitute a signiﬁcant chilling factor for both women and
doctors in the medical consultation process’,73 independently of whether there had in
fact been any prosecutions. In Tysiąc, the Court likewise drew attention to ‘a chilling
effect on doctors when deciding whether the requirements of legal abortion are met
in an individual case’.74 The Court observed: ‘The provisions regulating the availabil-
ity of lawful abortion should be formulated in such a way as to alleviate this effect’;
and it noted that ‘[o]nce the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not struc-
ture its legal framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it’.75
68 Tysiąc v Poland, para 116; A, B & C v Ireland, para 254.
69 Tysiąc v Poland, para 116 regarding uncertainty, and para 117 regarding formal review; A, B & C v Ireland,
para 253 regarding uncertainty and also formal review.
70 A, B & C v Ireland, para 253, citing the interpretation of Article 40.3.3 in Attorney General v X and Others
[1992] 1 IR 1 (‘the X case’).
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, para 254, my emphasis.
74 Tysiąc v Poland, para 116.
75 Ibid. The Court refers to the issue of review in para 117, and to the question of time and delay in para 118.
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Importantly, here it emphasises the signiﬁcant reduction in the margin of appreciation
once a state has permitted abortion under certain terms.
In England, too, there has been a dearth of prosecutions. The notable exception as
regards doctors is R v Smith, in which it was found that the doctor had not formed a
good-faith opinion with regard to section 1(1)(a) of the Act and had not sought a
second opinion before agreeing to terminate, despite alleging at trial that this was pro-
vided by the anaesthetist who in fact only saw the woman just before the procedure.76
The idea that uncertainty about the interpretation of the criteria could result in a ‘chil-
ling effect’ not just in Ireland, but also in England, may seem unlikely given that
English abortion law is much more liberal in that it permits termination on maternal
health grounds. However, while awareness of the fundamentally criminal nature of
abortion may be less widespread among the public than in Ireland, doctors are inevit-
ably aware of this facet of the law and could, therefore, be subject to a ‘chilling effect’.
The extent to which this could occur will likely turn on the climate in which doctors
are currently operating, notably whether this is one in which abortion is publicly per-
ceived as a procedure that should be relatively easily available, at least in the ﬁrst tri-
mester, or whether the accessibility of abortion is perceived as a matter of public
concern, which could in turn affect at least some doctors in their interpretation of the
criteria in section 1(1)(a).
Of signiﬁcance in relation to this point, relatively recently there was press coverage
about the possibility of terminations being authorised on the grounds of foetal sex
which, by itself, is not a ground for termination under English law, but which might
well qualify under section 1(1)(a).77 Certain clinics were investigated, also in relation
to signing practices of the relevant ‘HSA/1’ and ‘HSA/2’ forms.78 Subsequently, in
76 R v Smith [1973] 1 WLR 1510. Dr Smith appealed against his conviction. On the question of whether Dr
Smith had formed a good-faith opinion, Scarman LJ stated, 1517: ‘If accepted, . . . [the medical evidence]
indicated to the jury that it was usual for a doctor to make some inquiry into a girl’s background, environ-
ment, and personal history before reaching a decision. It was open to the jury to attach importance to the
speed with which Dr. Smith reached his decision to terminate, the seemingly superﬁcial nature of such
examination of her mental health as he alleged he made, and the total lack of any inquiry beyond a few
questions and answers when he ﬁrst saw the girl’.
77 Thus, a termination on the grounds of fetal sex might be justiﬁed where, for instance, the birth of a daugh-
ter to a woman from a particular ethnic background is going to put a woman’s mental and physical health
at risk in the requisite sense under s (1)(1)(a), for instance due to severe family pressure to have a son.
The BMA has expressed support for this view in its BMA Ethics Department, Law and Ethics of Abortion:
BMAViews (2007) para 1.7. This BMA view has in fact been noted by the CPS, <http://www.cps.gov.uk/
news/latest_news/dpp_abortion_case_fuller_reasons/>, last accessed 24 May 2015. For press coverage,
see eg H Watt, C Newell and Z Khimji, ‘Abortion Investigation: Available on Demand – an Abortion if It’s a
Boy You Wanted’, Daily Telegraph, 23 February 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/
9099925/Abortion-investigation-Available-on-demand-an-abortion-if-its-a-boy-you-wanted.html>, last accessed
24 May 2015. However, note that, arguably potentially misleadingly, the May 2014 DH Guidance in Relation
to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 (discussed below), only states under the heading ‘[a]bortion on
the ground of gender’: ‘Abortion on the grounds of gender alone is illegal. Gender is not itself a lawful
ground under the Abortion Act (see Annex A for the lawful grounds under Section 1(1)). However, it is
lawful to abort a fetus where two RMPs are of the opinion, formed in good faith, ‘that there is a substantial
risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped’, and some serious conditions are known to be gender-related.’ This last sentence refers to s 1
(1)(d) of the Act.
78 See CPS, above n 77.
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February 2012 the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer (CMO) sent a letter to doctors reiterating
the legal grounds, as they appear in the Act, for termination.79 Meanwhile, the
General Medical Council (GMC) put a statement on its website that was subse-
quently criticised (by letter to the GMC) by a number of medical law professors for
being ‘erroneous and misleading in important respects’; it was suggested in that letter
that the GMC should refer doctors to the CMO’s letter and the GMC subsequently
did this.80 In the light of this renewed attention to section 1(1)(a) of the Act, BPAS
stated in May 2013 that ‘doctors involved in abortion care have become nervous
about their everyday practice, as it no longer seems clear what is legal and illegal, or
which aspects of standard abortion practice may be suddenly highlighted as problem-
atic by the regulators’.81 Thus, despite the apparently liberal face of English abortion
law, these developments highlight the potential for the criminal nature of abortion
regulation to bear heavily on practice.
In October 2013 the CPS subsequently decided not to prosecute two doctors fol-
lowing investigations into apparent requests for terminations on the grounds of foetal
sex, on the basis that there was insufﬁcient evidence to prosecute to the criminal
standard and that it was not in the public interest.82 The CPS noted (in part) that83:
[T]here was no guidance on how a doctor should go about assessing the risk of
[sic] physical or mental health, no guidance on where the threshold of risk lies
and no guidance on a proper process for recording the assessment carried out.
The discretion afforded to a doctor in assessing the risk to the mental or physical
health of a patient wanting an abortion is wide and, having consulted an ex-
perienced consultant in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, it appears that there is no
generally accepted approach among the medical profession.
Referring to the CPS’s decision, the CMO subsequently stated that the CPS ‘high-
lighted the lack of guidance around how both doctors should go about assessing the
risk to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman’, and that the govern-
ment ‘will address these issues in revised guidance, while acknowledging the
79 CMO (Professor Dame Sally C. Davies), Letter of 23 February 2012, entitled ‘Abortion Act
(as amended): Termination of Pregnancy’, CEM/CMO/2012/16, <https://https://www.cas.dh.
gov.uk/ViewandAcknowledgment/ViewAlert.aspx?AlertID=101737>, last accessed 25 May 2015.
80 See <http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf>, last accessed 24
May 2015, 54–55, where the letter of July 2 2012 is reproduced.
81 ‘This extends throughout the abortion service, to nurses, midwives and managers; and to other doctors
working in gynaecology or psychiatric services, who are not directly involved in abortion care but may be
called upon to provide the ‘second signature’ on HSA1 forms.’ J Bristow, ‘Introduction’, in Britain’s Abor-
tion Law: What it Says and Why (BPAS), above n 64, 5.
82 See CPS, above n 77.
83 Ibid, my emphasis. With reference to the DH’s July 2013 ‘Guidance note for completing the HSA1 and
HSA2 abortion forms’, the CPS notes that ‘even the new guidance does not indicate that each doctor must
see and examine the patient before forming a view, only that he or she must have “enough evidence of the
woman’s circumstances to justify that they were able to form a good faith opinion that the ground for
termination exists”.’ This is available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/ﬁle/226928/2013_C_Guidance_note_for_completing_the_HSA1_and_HSA2_abortion_
forms.pdf>, last accessed 24 May 2015.
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discretion allowed to doctors under the Act in reaching a decision in good faith and
the role of clinical judgement’.84
Importantly, it is perhaps a matter of debate as to whether and, if so, to what extent
‘revised guidance’ is in fact required. While both Tysiąc and A, B & C highlighted the
possible need for guidelines under a state’s positive obligations, these decisions are by
no means prescriptive as to the degree of uncertainty that would generate the need
for guidelines or as to the requisite detail of such guidelines. The key legal point, as
regards the UK’s positive obligations, is that once a state has said that abortion is
lawful on certain grounds, it must protect or guarantee the availability of abortion on
those grounds, since its margin of appreciation in relation to abortion will have been
signiﬁcantly reduced.
As to what the lawful grounds for abortion are, on one view it might be thought
that the CMO’s letter of 23 February 2012, which was regarded positively by the
medical law professors who wrote to the GMC, may be sufﬁcient to explain the law,85
especially because the Abortion Act puts such weight on the good-faith opinion of
doctors, a point necessarily noted by the CMO in that letter. This may be particularly
so provided doctors are reassured as to the legal signiﬁcance of their good-faith opi-
nions, so that any possible ‘chilling effect’ is dispelled or avoided.86 Of note, the CPS
also highlights the width of medical discretion (in the passage quoted above) and the
signiﬁcance of doctor’s good-faith opinions to the operation of the Act, as in the
passage below87:
The prosecution would have to be in a position to prove, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the assessments carried out by the doctors was [sic] carried out in
bad faith or carried out in such a way that fell below a standard which any rea-
sonable doctor would consider adequate. In the absence of any considered
medical guidance it is extremely difﬁcult for the prosecution to undertake this
exercise. Equally, it would be very difﬁcult for a jury to assess what may or may
not be an ‘adequate’ assessment by the doctor.
Of note, the CPS here refers to the notion of ‘medical’ guidance as opposed, for
instance, to governmental guidance. Coupled with the CMO’s acknowledgement
(noted above in her letter of 22 November 2013) of ‘the discretion allowed to
doctors under the Act in reaching a decision in good faith and the role of clinical
judgement’, in fact this raises a very important point about the potential relationship
between any governmental guidance regarding the grounds for legal abortion and the
Abortion Act itself. Thus, as the CMO’s letter might be thought to indicate, any gov-
ernmental guidance must be compatible with the Abortion Act’s emphasis on the
84 CMO (Professor Dame Sally C. Davies), Letter of 22 November 2013, entitled ‘Abortion Act (as
amended): Termination of Pregnancy’, CEM/CMO/2013/16. This is available at <https://www.cas.dh.
gov.uk/ViewandAcknowledgment/ViewAlert.aspx?AlertID=102075>, last accessed 24 May 2015.
85 I am grateful to Sally Sheldon for suggesting this point to me: personal communication.
86 For instance, BPAS seeks to do this in its Britain’s Abortion Law: What it Says and Why, above n 64, at, eg,
6.
87 See CPS, above n 77, my emphasis.
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good-faith opinion of two doctors, since it is their good-faith opinion which renders
an abortion lawful under the Act.88
In this regard, and importantly, English law is notably different from the Irish law
that the ECtHR considered in A, B & C v Ireland which, as observed above, requires
‘as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life . . . of the
mother’.89 It is also different from the Polish law that the Court addressed in Tysiąc v
Poland, which ‘provided that legal abortion was possible only until the twelfth week of
pregnancy where the pregnancy endangered the mother’s life or health’,90 with
accompanying regulations stating that the ‘[t]he circumstances indicating that preg-
nancy constitutes a threat to the woman’s life or health shall be attested by a consultant
specialising in the ﬁeld of medicine relevant to the woman’s condition’.91 There is no
reference in either case to any good-faith medical opinion. In contrast, highlighting
the signiﬁcance of good faith to the operation of the English Abortion Act, in R v
Smith, Scarman LJ cited with approval part of the Recorder’s (Judge Sir Carl Aarvold)
summing up to the jury, as follows92:
If two doctors genuinely form an opinion in each case that they deal with that
the risk of continuance is more than the risk of termination, it does not matter
whether they are right or wrong in that view. If they form that opinion genuinely
and in good faith, that in fact comes within the Act, and there is no guilt
attached to it.
In May 2014, the DH issued its planned guidance, entitled Guidance in Relation
to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 (the Guidance).93 Interestingly, by way of
‘background’, this states94:
The guidance does not, and indeed cannot, change the law in relation to abor-
tion, which is governed by the criminal law and the Abortion Act and is ultim-
ately a matter for Parliament and the courts to determine. However, the intention
is to provide support for doctors by setting out how the law is interpreted by the
Department of Health.
88 I am grateful to Sally Sheldon for emphasising the relevance of this point to this discussion: personal com-
munication. This facet of English law has also been recently emphasised by Emily Jackson in ‘The Legality
of Abortion for Fetal Sex’, in Britain’s Abortion Law: What it Says and Why (BPAS), above n 64, 21.
89 A, B & C v Ireland, para 253, my emphasis, citing Attorney General v X and Others [1992] 1 IR 1 (‘the X
case’).
90 Tysiąc v Poland, para 38, referring to the Law on Family Planning (Protection of the Human Foetus and
Conditions Permitting Pregnancy Termination) Act 1993, s 4a.
91 Ibid, para 39, referring to an Ordinance issued by the Minister of Health on January 22 1997, s 2, my
emphasis.
92 R v Smith, my emphasis.
93 DH, Guidance in Relation to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967: For all those Responsible for Commission-
ing, Providing and Managing Service Provision (May, 2014). This is available at <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/313459/20140509_-_Abortion_Guidance_
Document.pdf>, last accessed May 24 2015.
94 Ibid, para 5, emphasis in original.
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On the question of ‘[f]orming an opinion in good faith’, the document states95:
If there is evidence that either certifying doctor has not formed their opinion in
good faith then the doctor performing the termination is not protected by
section 1(1) of the Abortion Act and has potentially committed a criminal
offence by terminating the pregnancy. It is also possible that the doctor could
be acting contrary to their professional duties.
The Guidance also notes that while there is ‘no legal requirement’ for at least one of
the doctors to have seen the woman, the DH view is that this is ‘good practice’.96 On
the question of certiﬁcation, the Guidance observes that this ‘takes place in the light
of . . . [the doctors’] clinical opinion of the circumstances of the pregnant woman’s
individual case’.97 As regards the ‘lawful grounds for abortion’, it notes that these are
‘set out’ in an Annex.98
The Act’s and Guidance’s emphasis on doctors’ good-faith opinion is relevant to
the government’s (and indeed Parliament’s) need to consider the automatic inter-
pretation argument (discussed above) that, as regards ﬁrst-trimester terminations, the
grounds for termination under section 1(1)(a) (and also, in fact, under section 1(1)
(c)) of the Act will always, or almost always, be made out. Indeed, given that medical
evidence and professional organisations such as the BMA and RCOG support this
interpretation, it is not clear that it would be open to the government to reject it,
given the Act’s emphasis on good-faith medical opinion. The DH Guidance does not
directly address this argument. Rather, with regard to the question of ‘[a]ssessing risk
to physical or mental health, the threshold of risk and recording how the assessment
is carried out’ (issues identiﬁed by the CPS, as noted above), it states99:
12. Whilst there is no statutory requirement for either doctor to have seen
and/or examined the woman, it is the Department’s interpretation of the law
that both doctors should ensure that they have considered sufﬁcient information
speciﬁc to the woman seeking a termination to be able to assess whether the
woman satisﬁes one of the lawful grounds under the Abortion Act.
13. This assessment will include consideration of any risk to the woman’s
physical or mental health as one of the lawful grounds. The identiﬁcation of
where the threshold of risk to the physical or mental health of the woman lies is a
matter for the clinical opinion for each of the doctors.
95 Ibid, para 9. It also notes: ‘Practices have come to light recently which call into question whether doctors
have acted in accordance with their legal obligations under the Abortion Act. These practices include the
signing of HSA1 forms by doctors before a woman has been referred, and doctors signing forms relying
solely on decisions made about the woman in question by other doctors or members of the multi-
disciplinary team without any other information’. Ibid, para 10.
96 Ibid, para 6.
97 Ibid, para 11.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid, paras 12, 13 and 14, my emphasis, footnotes citing ss 19 and 71, Good Medical Practice, General
Medical Council (2013) omitted in the last line.
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14. Although the burden of proof would be on a prosecutor to show that an
opinion was not formed in good faith, DH recommend that RMPs should be
prepared to justify how they considered information speciﬁc to the woman when
forming their opinion, for example by recording in the patient record that they
have assessed the relevant information and reached the conclusion based on
this information. This is in line with guidance from the GMC (see Annex B).
Importantly, this accepts that the ‘threshold of risk’ is a matter of clinical judgment.
While the Guidance stresses the need to consider ‘sufﬁcient information speciﬁc to
the woman’, this is by no means inconsistent with the medical evidence (as detailed,
for instance, by the BMA)100 and, in the light of that, the BMA’s and RCOG’s view
that the ground will always be fulﬁlled, except if the doctors were to judge that there is
something in a particular woman’s circumstances to upset the statistical balance.
(Recall here Andrew Grubb’s argument and his point (cited earlier) that ‘[u]ltimately,
the doctors must form an opinion that the ground applies to . . . [the woman] and
not solely on the basis of abstract statistics’.) In other words, in the light of
the medical evidence regarding risks, a doctor may well simply conﬁrm (in fact) that
the ground applies, provided nothing in a woman’s particular circumstances changes
the statistical balance (which is very unlikely). Importantly, attending to the relevant
statistical risks would be consistent with the evidence-based approach to medicine
that has become prevalent since the Act was passed.
Accordingly, since the criteria in section 1(1)(a) will always (or almost always) be
satisﬁed, the government needs to consider my earlier conclusion, with reference to
the ‘necessity’ analysis under Article 8(2), that the criminalisation of abortion in the
ﬁrst trimester is not a justiﬁable interference with a woman’s right to respect for her
private life under Article 8. Although the DH Guidance states that ‘[t]he purpose of
the requirement that two doctors certify the ground(s) for termination is to ensure
that the law is being observed; this provides protection for the woman and for the
doctors providing the termination’,101 this cannot be relevant to the question of the
justiﬁability of the current legal arrangement. In the Government Response to the Report
from the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on the Scientiﬁc Develop-
ments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967 in 2007, with reference to the Committee’s
recommendation that the two-signature requirement should be removed, the govern-
ment stated102:
We note the Committee’s recommendations. The requirement for two doctors’
signatures was believed necessary when the Abortion Act 1967 was passed, to
ensure that the provisions in the 1967 Act were being observed and to safeguard
100 BMA, see further above nn 57 and 61.
101 Here the Guidance cites the House of Commons Science and Technology Report, above n 45, no para-
graph number given. However, in that Report this was listed as just one possible reason, as cited in text fol-
lowing n 45 above.
102 Government Response to the Report from the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on the Sci-
entiﬁc Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967 (2007) Cm 7278, 7, citing para 99 of the Committee’s
Report, above n 45.
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women. The decision to require two doctors’ signatures was based on profes-
sional opinion at the time. We note that both the British Medical Association
and the RCOG believe that there is no need for two doctors’ signatures in the
ﬁrst trimester, and this will be a consideration for Members of Parliament if this
issue should come before Parliament.
In the light of the argument in this paper, the government now also needs to consider
the compatibility of the two-signature requirement, coupled with the current criminal-
isation of abortion in the ﬁrst trimester and the operation of section 1(1)(a) in that
trimester, with Article 8 of the ECHR. The question of possible law reform is
addressed below.
2. Review
The Tysiąc Court observed that the ‘concepts of lawfulness’ and the rule of law
require that ‘measures affecting human rights be, in certain cases, subject to some
form of procedure before an independent body competent to review the reasons for
the measures and the relevant evidence’.103 It also stated that, with regard to the issue
of abortion, ‘such a procedure should guarantee to a pregnant woman at least the pos-
sibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered’ by a ‘competent
body’,104 which should provide written reasons. Building on Tysiąc, similar observa-
tions were made by the Court in RR v Poland.105 The Court in A, B & C, which raised
a number of concerns about the ‘effectiveness’106 of the ‘ordinary medical consult-
ation process between a woman and her doctor . . . as a means of establishing . . . [the
woman’s] qualiﬁcation for a lawful abortion’,107 likewise criticised the Irish state, spe-
ciﬁcally in relation to the third applicant in that case, for the absence of a108:
[f ]ramework whereby any difference of opinion between the woman and her
doctor or between different doctors consulted, or whereby an understandable
hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be examined and resolved
through a decision which would establish as a matter of law whether a particular
case presented a qualifying risk to a woman’s life such that a lawful abortion
might be performed.
It might be noted here that Ireland has now acted to rectify its breach in relation to
the third applicant in that case by enacting the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act
2013.109 (In contrast, as noted earlier, given that the ﬁrst and second applicants were
able to travel to England to obtain a lawful abortion, the Court found no breach
103 Tysiąc v Poland, para 117.
104 Ibid.
105 RR v Poland, paras 201–214, esp. 208–11.
106 A, B & C v Ireland para 253.
107 Ibid, paras 252–3.
108 Ibid, para 253.
109 A discussion of the Act, which sets out to clarify the grounds for lawful abortion in Ireland and to provide
for a system of review, at the woman’s request, of medical opinions in relation to her pregnancy, is outwith
my current scope. For brief reference to the facts of A, B & C, see above n 5.
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under a negative analysis, thus permitting what Erdman has here described as a ‘harm
reduction’ approach to bolster the highly restrictive nature of Irish abortion law.110)
One reason for a doctor to decline to agree to provide an abortion is that of con-
scientious objection. In RR v Poland, the ECtHR held111:
States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a way as to
ensure that an effective exercise of the freedom of conscience of health profes-
sionals in the professional context does not prevent patients from obtaining
access to services to which they are entitled under the applicable legislation.
Further, in P & S v Poland the Court gave careful consideration to whether the rele-
vant ‘procedural requirements’ had, in reality, been given proper effect and found that
they had not been.112 Thus, the Court is prepared to consider this issue very closely.
Turning now to consider the issues of conscientious objection and review in the
English context, and reﬂecting on the operation of the law also beyond the ﬁrst tri-
mester, the DH does not collect data on how many terminations are declined. At
present, however, a woman who has not been granted a termination can seek to have
her termination approved by other doctors. The House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee heard evidence relating to the possibility of doctors’ right of
conscientious objection (which it did not question) creating delay in access to abor-
tion.113 The Committee noted that ‘in the guidelines commissioned and promoted
by the Department of Health, it is recommended that practitioners who conscien-
tiously object should refer the patient as soon as possible to another doctor who does
not conscientiously object’.114 The Committee stated that115:
Professional guidance is not as clear as this and we urge the General Medical
Council, while preserving the right of doctors to conscientiously object and not
to refer directly to another doctor for an abortion unless it is an emergency, to
make clear that conscientious objectors should alert patients to the fact that
they do not consult on abortions and that if the issue arises during a consult-
ation that they have a duty immediately to refer the patient to another doctor
for the consultation.
Where a doctor has a conscientious objection to abortion, current GMC guidelines
(2008) now state that s/he must ‘tell patients of their right to see another doctor with
whom they can discuss their situation and ensure that they have sufﬁcient information
to exercise that right’;116 moreover, that ‘if the patient cannot readily make their own
arrangements to see another doctor [doctors] must ensure that arrangements are
110 A, B & C v Ireland para 241, and above n 5; Erdman, above n 51, 460. She notes, at 461, that ‘[a] neutral
and pragmatic harm reduction approach refuses to engage with abortion as a normative matter’.
111 RR v Poland, para 206.
112 P & S v Poland, para 107.
113 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45, para 108.
114 Ibid, para 109, citing <http://www.medfash.org.uk/publications/documents/recommended_
standards_for sex health services.pdf>, now available at http://www.medfash.org.uk/uploads/ﬁles/
p17abl5efr149kqsu10811h21i3tt.pdf, last accessed May 24 2015.
115 Ibid, para 102.
116 General Medical Council, Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice (2008) para 21.
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made, without delay, for another doctor to take over their care’.117 If doctors follow
these guidelines, a woman will know that she has the chance at least to seek a termin-
ation elsewhere.
However, where a termination is refused and reasons of conscience are not present
or cited, the important question arises as to whether a woman will be aware that doctors
might interpret the grounds under the Act differently, particularly as they apply beyond
the ﬁrst trimester, rather than that a termination may simply not be available under the
law. A great deal will turn on the knowledge and social awareness of the pregnant
woman herself at this juncture.118 In some ways, seeking a second opinion would be an
informal self-generated form of review of the ﬁrst opinion(s) given. Whether a woman
obtains a termination will turn on the view of the second doctor whom she consults (or
third and so on if she is persistent enough). Such a system is vulnerable because of pos-
sible differences of opinion between doctors. Moreover, the implications of both Tysiąc
and A, B & C are that this current system may breach the UK’s positive obligations
under Article 8, notwithstanding that the operation of English abortion law hinges on
doctors’ good-faith opinions in a way that the Irish and Polish law do not.
A review procedure would have to allow for a woman’s views to be heard, and any
hearing and decision would have to take place in a sufﬁciently timely fashion, given
the importance of the avoidance of delay, a point noted by the Tysiąc court.119 As
has been emphasised above, much would still turn in any review on what can be a
good-faith interpretation and application of the criteria in section 1(1)(a), either
throughout the ﬁrst and second trimesters, if the automatic interpretation point
regarding the ﬁrst trimester were not accepted by the government or the courts
(which, it has been suggested, would not in fact be open to them), or if it were, then
only between 12 and 24 weeks. From the point of view of a woman seeking a termin-
ation, while a review procedure may be burdensome, it would not be as burdensome
as the situation of a failure to secure a termination and no recourse to review.
However, the question of legal alternatives that would be less burdensome, notably
the idea of a right to abort per se (that is, one that does not have to be justiﬁed with
regard to particular risks or reasons), at least in the ﬁrst trimester, is brieﬂy consid-
ered below.
Before I turn to consider reform of English law, I touch on the important question
of to what extent the just-discussed issues of guidelines and review can be understood
only as ‘procedural’ ones as others, such as Zampas and Gher, have described
117 Ibid, para 22.
118 I do not have the scope to discuss potential discrimination issues here, but these are helpfully noted by
Erdman, above n 51, 433–4, with reference also to the ECtHR’s decision in Open Door and Dublin Well
Woman v Ireland, App. Nos 14234/88 & 14235/88, 15 Eur HR Rep 244 (1992). In this case, the Court
found a breach of Article 10 in relation to ‘an injunction imposed by the Irish courts on Open Door and
Dublin Well Woman to restrain them from providing certain information to pregnant women concerning
abortion facilities outside the jurisdiction of Ireland by way of non-directive counselling’ (at para 9); it
found that ‘the injunction may have had more adverse effects on women who were not sufﬁciently
resourceful or had not the necessary level of education to have access to alternative sources of information’
(at para 77).
119 Tysiąc v Poland, para 118, particularly with reference to late abortion, given the facts of the case. The ques-
tion of delay is discussed by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45,
especially in paras 88 and 101.
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them.120 Indeed, the Tysiąc Court might be said itself to invite this description by
noting that ‘[w]hile Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, it is
important for the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by this provision that
the relevant decision-making process is fair and such as to afford due respect to the
interests safeguarded by it’.121 Of note, this reference by the majority to ‘procedural
requirements’ might be thought, perhaps for political reasons, to downplay the signiﬁ-
cance of the ﬁnding of a breach in Tysiąc. Indeed, Judge Bonello—in his Separate
Opinion—stressed that he was prepared to ﬁnd a violation simply on the basis that122
[t]he Court was only called upon to decide whether, in cases of conﬂicting
views (between a pregnant woman and doctors, or between the doctors them-
selves) as to whether the conditions to obtain a legal abortion were satisﬁed or
not, effective mechanisms capable of determining the issue were in place.
3. The Relationship Between Substance and Procedure, Interference and Respect
An important question that arises in relation to a state’s positive obligations regarding,
for instance, respect for a woman’s interests in psychological and physical integrity
under Article 8, is to what extent respect for these interests has substantive, rather
than, say, only procedural implications. In this regard, the partly dissenting Judge de
Gaetano in RR v Poland criticised the majority both in Tysiąc and in RR for not analys-
ing the cases under Article 6.123 In effect, this criticism raises the question of the rela-
tionship between substantive and procedural interests in this context. It also raises the
question of the relationship between a state’s negative and positive obligations, and
the meaning of each of these in turn. There are a number of statements in Tysiąc that
make the Court’s position on this issue somewhat unclear.
Opening its consideration of Article 8, the Court observes124:
[T]he applicant complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach
of Article 8 of the Convention. Her right to due respect for her private life and
her physical and moral integrity had been violated both substantively, by failing
to provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion, and as regards the State’s posi-
tive obligations, by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee
her rights.
120 Zampas and Gher, above n 12, 279: ‘The ECtHR’s Article 8 analysis [in Tysiąc] holds states to their pro-
cedural obligation to make abortion practically available where it is legally available. However, the Tysiąc
decision may indicate the ECtHR’s unwillingness to address substantive violations of human rights, even
when there is a legal basis for abortion, and propensity to rely on procedural violations to remedy the
wrong’. My emphasis. See also 293.
121 Tysiąc v Poland, para 113, my emphasis.
122 Ibid. Separate Opinion of Judge Bonello, para 2.
123 RR v Poland, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Gaetano, para 4. The only potentially relevant part of
Art 6(1) reads: ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.’My emphasis.
124 Tysiąc v Poland, para 67, my emphases.
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As the Court reports the applicant’s argument, the term ‘substantively’ is implicitly
used in conjunction with the State’s negative obligations and the term ‘guarantee of
rights’ is used in conjunction with the State’s positive obligations. Later, the Court
observes that ‘the applicant submitted that the refusal of an abortion had also
amounted to an interference with her rights guaranteed by Article 8’, but that ‘the
Court is of the view that the circumstances of the applicant’s case and in particular
the nature of her complaint are more appropriately examined from the standpoint of
the respondent State’s . . . positive obligations alone’, apparently now using the term
‘guarantee’ in conjunction with the concept of negative obligations.125 The boundar-
ies between the Court’s reporting of the applicant’s argument and its own statements
are not fully clear in the passages quoted, but the Court appears to use the notion of
‘guaranteeing rights’ both in relation to its negative and positive analyses. In this light,
we might ask here why a failure of positive obligations does not amount to an ‘inter-
ference’ with a right, thus more overtly raising substantive issues?
Indeed, it is apparent that ﬂaws in a legal regime governing abortion, such as the
absence of a review procedure, can affect the substantive question of whether a
woman is able legally to obtain an abortion to which the law says she is entitled. In
other words, what might be seen as the ‘purely procedural’ issue of the absence of a
review mechanism in this context in fact affects the substantive question of access to
abortion. For this reason, the partly dissenting Judge de Gaetano’s criticism that both
Tysiąc and RR v Poland should instead have been analysed under Article 6 is not sus-
tainable. Indeed, the effect of that argument would be to neglect the positive obliga-
tions that a state has under Article 8 in addition, that is, to its negative ones. As
regards the legal position in Poland itself, what the Court effectively says in these
cases is that the state failed positively to respect the legally protected interest in abor-
tion that a woman has under Polish law. It is worth noting here that, unlike Ireland,
Polish law on its face is compatible with the consensus view (noted earlier) that abor-
tion should be available on maternal health grounds because it recognises maternal
health interests as a legal ground for abortion.
Thus, while the Court’s focus in these cases was ostensibly on procedural issues,
the issues clearly have a bearing on the substantive question of access to abortion, as
Fenwick—who notes that ‘a purely “procedural” reading does not fully exhaust the
implications’ of the cases—likewise suggests.126 This may also account for the disquiet
of the dissenting Judge Borrego in Tysiąc, who went so far as to say that the Court con-
tradicted itself when it said that ‘it is not the Court’s task in the present case to examine
whether the Convention guarantees a right to have an abortion’,127 and that by means
of its ﬁndings the Court was, in effect, permitting ‘abortion on demand’.128 The poten-
tially substantive implications of supposedly purely procedural ﬂaws give further weight
to the need for at least some degree of English law reform, to which I now turn.
125 Ibid, para 108, my emphasis.
126 Fenwick, above n 4, 265.
127 Tysiąc v Poland, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego, para 13, citing para 104.
128 Ibid, para 13. In supposed support he cited the following passage, from para 128, of the Court’s judgment:
‘Having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, it cannot therefore be said that . . . the Polish
State complied with the positive obligations to safeguard the applicant’s right to respect for her private life
in the context of a controversy as to whether she was entitled to a therapeutic abortion’.
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C. Law Reform
Currently, English abortion law might be said to be characterised by a degree of prag-
matic compromise. Margaret Brazier and Susanne Ost have insightfully argued that this is
expressive of a political liberal balance, realised by means of the criminal law, between
conﬂicting moral views as to the respective strength of the pregnant woman’s and the
foetus’s interests or claims.129 Despite this, the analysis in this article has shown that, as
regards Article 8 of the ECHR, aspects of the law are also problematic in signiﬁcant ways.
There are two possible responses to the problem, particularly, of the lack of justiﬁ-
cation for the requirements in section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act as this operates in
the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy. First, the grounds for termination could be revised in
some way, so that the statistical argument—under which ‘few, if any’ (per the BMA)
women would not satisfy the criteria—no longer applies in the ﬁrst trimester. In the
alternative, access to termination of pregnancy in the ﬁrst trimester (and potentially
beyond) could be further liberalised so that women have a right to abort per se, some-
times known as a right to abortion ‘on request’. Others, such as Sally Sheldon, have
long argued for this in insightful and important ways.130 Very importantly, if English
law were to be reformed to grant a time-limited right to abortion, this would be in
line with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s recommendations,
back in 2008, in favour of the decriminalisation of abortion ‘within reasonable gesta-
tional limits’ and the granting of ‘freedom of choice’ with regard to abortion in all
states where this has not already occurred.131
If a woman were to have a time-limited right to abort per se, she would have the
right to abort without being subject to an assessment—or rather a conﬁrmation, in
the ﬁrst trimester—of the risks in her case, or of her reasons. (Of course, the latter
could well have a bearing on her risks, particularly as regards the question of psycho-
logical integrity.) As noted earlier, the BMA recommended in evidence to the House
of Commons Science and Technology Committee that ‘the Abortion Act 1967
should be amended so that ﬁrst trimester abortion (abortions up to 13 weeks) is avail-
able on the same basis of informed consent as other treatment, and therefore without
the need for two doctors’ signatures, and without the need to meet speciﬁed medical
criteria’.132 The BMA stressed that ‘[f]rom a clinical perspective abortion is better
carried out early in pregnancy’ and, as noted earlier, drew attention to the statistical
argument.133 It also stressed that ‘[t]he proposed amendment would help ensure that
women seeking abortion are not exposed to delays, and consequently to later, more
costly and higher risk procedures’.134
129 M Brazier and S Ost, Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law, Vol. 3: Medicine and Bioethics in the Theatre
of the Criminal Process (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013) 194.
130 See eg her aptly entitled ‘“Who is the Mother to Make the Judgment”: Constructions of Woman in UK
Abortion Law’ (1993) 1 Fem Leg Stud 3–22; see also S Sheldon, ‘Abortion Law and the Politics of
Medical Control’, in J Bridgman and S Millns (eds), Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body
(Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995) 105–24.
131 Council of Europe, above n 13, paras 7.1 and 7.3, respectively. Para 7.3 also refers to ‘offer[ing] the condi-
tions for a free and enlightened choice without speciﬁcally promoting abortion’.
132 BMA, above n 61, para 2.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
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We have also seen that the House of Commons Science and Technology Commit-
tee found that it had not heard ‘any good evidence that, at least in the ﬁrst trimester,
the requirement for two doctors’ signatures serves to safeguard women or doctors in
any meaningful way, or serves any other useful purpose’.135 As noted, the Committee
also observed that it was ‘concerned that the requirement . . . may be causing delays in
access to abortion services’.136 Further, the Committee was not satisﬁed with the gov-
ernment’s submission ‘that the high percentage (89%) of abortions that take place in
the ﬁrst trimester is an indicator that “there is not a problem”’.137 The DH has
recently observed that ‘Department of Health policy is that women who are legally
entitled to an abortion should have access to the procedure as soon as possible. Evi-
dence shows that the risk of complications increases the later the gestation’.138 Thus,
not only are the requirements of section 1(1)(a) as a condition of lawful access to
most ﬁrst-trimester abortions unjustiﬁable under Article 8(2) of the ECHR. In add-
ition, in the event that the requirements were to delay access to termination beyond
the ﬁrst trimester, a woman would then undergo a more risky surgical termination. In
the light of the argument in this paper, and very signiﬁcantly, there would be no legal
justiﬁcation for the imposition of these increased risks. Thus, issues of harm reduction
would also be importantly implicated in decriminalisation, for instance within a
certain gestational limit.139
Further, as the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee stressed,
reform would aid the ‘goal of public policy . . . of encourag[ing] early as opposed to
later abortion’.140 Apart from the question of reduced maternal risks with early abor-
tion, on the gradualist account of the foetus’s legal status that is embedded in English
abortion law (given that section 1(1)(a) no longer applies after 24 weeks),141 the law
implicitly represents that the foetus’s moral status increases during its gestation, thus
potentially requiring greater justiﬁcation for termination as pregnancy progresses.
Thus, reform that helped to ensure that desired terminations occurred earlier rather
than later would be in line with this position.
Rights-based approaches may have the down-side, in closely contested moral areas,
of creating a polarising effect on public debate, as Brazier and Ost also note.142
Indeed, this itself might be thought to be a reason in favour of the compromise cur-
rently represented by English abortion law. For instance, the issue of abortion is
heavily polarised in the rights-based context of the United States. However, this may
have been so long before the Supreme Court established the right to abort in Roe v
135 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45, para 99.
136 Ibid, para 99. Empirical evidence would be needed in support of this point.
137 Ibid, para 97, footnote omitted. Here it noted that ‘[t]he Government is some way from meeting its aim of
all PCTs carrying out a majority of abortions by 9 weeks and eventually 70% by 9 weeks’. Footnote
omitted.
138 DH, above n 8, para 2.17.
139 See further Erdman, above n 51, 458: ‘[L]iberalisation of abortion laws, including decriminalization
throughout pregnancy or to a deﬁned gestational limit, is associated with signiﬁcantly decreased abortion-
related harm’. Footnote citing extensive references omitted.
140 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, above n 45, para 99.
141 Above n 7.
142 Brazier and Ost, above n 129, 194.
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Wade.143 It may be particularly helpful to look elsewhere in Europe, where there are
several countries, including Denmark and Sweden, that permit abortion ‘upon
request’ until a certain gestational limit.144 If a right to abort were established in
English law, the question would arise as to the duration of that right, and as to the
implications for the interpretation of the law beyond the time-limit for its exercise.
On one model, there could be a right until the end of the ﬁrst trimester (13 weeks,
per the BMA).145 The second trimester could then be governed by an arrangement
similar to, or the same as, that which is now in place. Alternatively, a right could be
granted until approximately 18 weeks (as in Sweden) or until the point of foetal via-
bility—which has a moral signiﬁcance that is also compatible with the notion of the
foetus acquiring interests with the development of sentience (which is at about the
same time)146—leaving the decision to a duly informed (as to medical risks and so
forth) and, it would be hoped, morally reﬂective pregnant woman. The remaining
grounds would continue to be relevant after 24 weeks.147
Overall, it would be very important that any reform, say, of ﬁrst- or ﬁrst- and second-
trimester abortion law does not make access to abortion thereafter harder than it cur-
rently is, as for instance the BMA has also noted.148 The question of the political appetite
for abortion law reform is, of course, another matter.149
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article has considered the compatibility of aspects of English abortion law with
the ECHR. The UK is a party to the European consensus under Article 8 that abor-
tion should be available on maternal health grounds and not just, for instance, where
143 Roe v Wade. For an argument that Roe did not in fact create polarising conﬂict regarding abortion, see L
Greenhouse and R Siegal, ‘Before (and After) Roe v Wade: New Questions About Backlash’ (2011) 120
Yale LJ 2028–87.
144 United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Abortion Policies: A
Global Review (2002). This is available at <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/
proﬁles.htm>, last accessed May 24 2015. The following citations are from the individual country reports
(no page numbers available); for further details, see the full country reports. In Denmark, ‘Law No. 350 of
13 June 1973 entitles women domiciled in Denmark to undergo an abortion during the ﬁrst 12 weeks of
pregnancy, after the submission of an application for abortion. In addition, the woman is to be informed of
the nature and risks of the procedure and of the possibilities for assistance if the pregnancy should continue
to term’. In Sweden, the relevant law is the Swedish Abortion Law of June 14 1974. ‘The law, which came
into effect in 1975, permits the interruption of pregnancy on request, provided there are no medical contra-
indications (that is, that the procedure will not seriously endanger the woman’s life or health), during the
ﬁrst 18 weeks of pregnancy. For pregnancies between 12 and 18 weeks of pregnancy, the pregnant woman
is required to discuss the abortion with a social worker’.
145 BMA, above n 61, para 2.
146 For relevant discussion see, respectively, eg, N Rhoden, ‘Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v
Wade’ (1986) 95 Yale LJ 639 and B Steinbock, Life Before Birth: the Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and
Fetuses (OUP: New York, 2nd edn, 2011) 46–9. This is not to suggest that the notion of viability is not
complex and contested. For relatively recent discussion of relevance at the policy level, see BMA, Abortion
Time Limits: a Brieﬁng Paper from the BMA (May 2005) 14–17.
147 I have discussed s 1(1)(d) in detail elsewhere. See R Scott, Choosing Possible Lives: Law and Ethics of Pre-
natal and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) Ch 2.
148 The BMA has stated: ‘BMA policy is clear that any changes in relation to ﬁrst trimester abortion should
not adversely impact upon the availability of later abortions.’ BMA Ethics Department, above n 77, para
2.1.4.
149 Of recent historical relevance to this point, see Sheldon, above n 52.
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there is a risk to the woman’s life (as in Ireland). Yet it is not clear that English law is
fully compatible with the Convention. While this may seem surprising, it is in accord-
ance with the approach of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
which noted that while ‘[a]bortion is permitted in the majority of European countries
for a number of reasons . . . [t]he Assembly is nonetheless concerned that, in many of
these states, numerous conditions are imposed and restrict the effective access to safe,
affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services’, citing ‘repeated medical con-
sultations’ as an example.150
The relationship between the statistical argument and section 1(1)(a) of the Act
has here been analysed for the ﬁrst time in relation to human rights obligations. The
analysis has shown that criminalising abortion in the ﬁrst trimester unless there is a
risk to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health of going to term that is
greater than in termination is not justiﬁed under a negative analysis of the UK’s obli-
gation to respect private life, under the ‘automatic’ interpretation of that section. In
short, since there is ‘strong evidence that [section 1(1)(a)] is always met for ﬁrst tri-
mester abortions’ (per the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee,
as noted above), to impose a requirement to this effect as a condition of lawful access
to abortion in all cases (in relation to which the other grounds are not appropriate,
that is) is unnecessary. Accordingly, seeking to make access to lawful abortion condi-
tional on fulﬁlment of the terms of section 1(1)(a) would not pass the test to justify
interference in a woman’s private life under Article 8(2). Given that the majority of
abortions are carried out under this ground of the Act before 12 weeks, this is highly
signiﬁcant. Moreover, as it stands, the operation of the law may result in some cases in
delayed access to termination, coupled with the increased maternal risks of second-
trimester surgical abortion, for which there would be no legal justiﬁcation on the
UK’s part.151
Given the importance of good-faith medical opinion to the operation of the Act, it
is doubtful if the UK is in breach of its positive obligations under Article 8 by failing
to provide more detailed guidelines regarding the interpretation of the grounds in the
Abortion Act. However, the lack of a system of formal review of any two doctors’ deci-
sions not to grant a termination is problematic and, while at one level a procedural
issue, clearly has the potential to impact on the substantive question of access to abor-
tion. Thus, regardless of the relatively liberal face of English abortion law, in practice
access to termination could be illegitimately hampered—a position that cannot
be protected by the margin of appreciation once a given legal arrangement is in place
—thereby potentially putting the UK in breach of Article 8 and in tension with the
Convention’s intent that rights be real, and not illusory.
150 Council of Europe, above n 13, para 2: ‘These restrictions have discriminatory effects, since women who
are well informed and possess adequate ﬁnancial means can often obtain legal and safe abortions more
easily’. See also para 3: ‘The Assembly also notes that, in member states where abortion is permitted for a
number of reasons, conditions are not always such as to guarantee women effective access to this right: the
lack of local health care facilities, the lack of doctors willing to carry out abortions, the repeated medical con-
sultations required, the time allowed for changing one’s mind and the waiting time for the abortion all have
the potential to make access to safe, affordable, acceptable and appropriate abortion services more difﬁcult,
or even impossible in practice’. My emphasis.
151 The bearing that empirical evidence would have on this point was noted above.
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If a limited right to abort were established in English law this could be restricted,
not by the question of the degree to which the interests in physical and psychological
integrity must be invoked, with reference to maternal risks or reasons (as is necessary
for instance in relation to the comparative exercise at stake in section 1(1)(a)), but
rather by time-limits. In essence, this would of course be to prioritise an autonomy-
focused interpretation of Article 8 in the abortion context over one which stresses the
maternal interests in physical and psychological integrity, that is, the maternal health
interests on which the majority of the lawful grounds for abortion are currently
founded.152 At the same time, a shift to an autonomy-oriented focus could be said to
accord respect to a pregnant woman as a moral agent and a degree of protection to the
decision to terminate, conditions relevant to human ﬂourishing and thus reasons to
confer a (limited) right, as David Feldman has noted more generally in discussion of the
relationship between privacy and autonomy, and also with particular reference to abor-
tion.153 Erdman has likewise noted the signiﬁcance of moral agency with particular refer-
ence to the decriminalisation of abortion regulation in response to a human rights
critique.154 While the question of the relationship between privacy and autonomy is long-
standing, we have seen that the Court can be said to be increasingly recognising the
importance of autonomy interests, including to some extent in the abortion context.155
Further, their importance is embedded in the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, which explicitly stated that ‘the ultimate decision on whether
or not to have an abortion should be a matter for the woman concerned, who should
have the means of exercising this right in an effective way’.156
Very importantly, recognition of a time-limited autonomy-based right would not be
incompatible with an acknowledgement of the moral seriousness of abortion, as implied
152 I leave to one side here the ‘fetal disability’ ground under section 1(1)(d). However, I agree with S Sheldon’s
and S Wilkinson's argument that the disability ground can be interpreted as invoking parental interests,
particularly where a fetus would as a child have an impairment compatible with a life she/he thinks is
worth living. S Sheldon and S Wilkinson, ‘Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are
There Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?’ (2001) 9 Med Law Rev 85–109. See also my discussion of
these issues in Scott, above n 147.
153 In connection with privacy and its links with autonomy and dignity, Feldman has written: ‘The combin-
ation of the idea of a right to be respected as a moral agent with the idea of social spheres of decision-
making within which people or groups are entitled to regard themselves as free from outside coercion are,
I suggest, of the essence of the notion of privacy as a civil liberty’. ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views
of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 47 Curr Legal Problem 41–71, 55. He refers, in this connection, to the
issue of abortion in his ‘Privacy-related Rights and their Social Value’ in P Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty
(OUP: Oxford, 1997) 15–50, 42. Feldman argues that the weight and signiﬁcance of privacy derives from
its ability to facilitate the conditions for diverse forms of human ﬂourishing (ibid, 21). For Feldman,
privacy is primarily a value, rather than a right, which spawns ‘privacy-related’ rights which protect the con-
ditions necessary for ‘valuable personal and social activity’ (ibid, 16).
154 Erdman, above n 51, 443, where she refers to women being ‘entrusted to make decisions’ and 461, where
she notes that, under international human rights law, ‘[c]riminal abortion laws are interpreted to violate
women’s rights where they deny normative plurality on the meaning and signiﬁcance of abortion’.
155 See citations from A, B & C v Ireland and RR v Poland, above nn 19 and 20, respectively.
156 Council of Europe, above n 13, para 6. See also, with respect to reform of English abortion law, Sheldon,
above n 52, 4: ‘[T]he fact that abortion decisions are serious, with potentially far-reaching implications is all
the more reason for believing that it is the pregnant women themselves who must make them. The women
concerned are more likely to agonise over abortion decisions and they are better placed than doctors to be
able to understand the implications of the decision for their own lives and the lives of those closest to them’.
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for instance by the US Supreme Court in Roe v Wade itself, with its recognition of a
state interest in ‘potential life’, reafﬁrmed, for example, in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v Casey.157 Indeed, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe itself stressed at the outset of its Resolution that ‘[a]bortion must, as far as pos-
sible, be avoided. All possible means compatible with women’s rights must be used to
reduce the number of both unwanted pregnancies and abortions’.158 Thus, given the
morally serious nature of the decision to terminate a pregnancy, importantly it would
also be appropriate for any English law reform to be accompanied by increased atten-
tion to appropriate sexual and reproductive education, information and advice and to
the availability of contraception, in ways helpfully stressed—with reference to relevant
evidence on the relationship between these and a reduction in the number of unwanted
pregnancies, and therefore abortions—by the Parliamentary Assembly itself.159
The question of the time-limit of a right would, of course, require very careful
thought. If this were to be 24 weeks, after this time not only would the issue of ter-
mination more likely arise because of severe medical risks to the woman (under sec-
tions 1(1)(b) and (c)) or because of issues relating to foetal disability under section 1
(1)(d), but also, it may well be widely thought that the foetus has stronger moral
interests, so that an unlimited legal right to abort would be inappropriate.160 In fact,
since the great majority of terminations are conducted in the ﬁrst trimester, a shorter
time-limit would still make a very signiﬁcant difference (such as 18, or more particu-
larly, 13 weeks),161 with termination thereafter being no less restrictive than at
present. Overall, the analysis has demonstrated that Convention law regarding abor-
tion is more complex and subtle than might be supposed, as is the question of
whether any given state’s abortion law, however apparently liberal, is Convention-
compliant, as shown here with reference to the UK.
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157 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey. See further above n 50. For extensive discussion,
see especially R Dworkin, above n 7.
158 Council of Europe, above n 13, para 1.
159 Ibid. See paras 1, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7. Of note, in 2013, ‘[t]he abortion rate was highest for women aged 22
(at 30 per 1,000)’. DH, above n 8, Executive Summary, p 5. See also the Council of Europe’s recommenda-
tion, above n 13, para 7.8, that member states ‘promote a more pro-family attitude in public information
campaigns and provide counselling and practical support to help women where the reason for wanting an
abortion is family or ﬁnancial pressure’.
160 Roe v Wade itself established a limit of 24 weeks, 35 LEd2d at 163–4. It is beyond my scope on this occa-
sion to address the basis for the law beyond a time-limit for a right to abort.
161 The currently existing limit in Swedish law, above n 144, and the limit suggested by the BMA, above n 61,
para 2, respectively. For the law to be no less restrictive than at present, s 1(1)(a) would thus need to be
retained, respectively, either from 18 or 13 weeks, up to 24 weeks.
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